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UNITED NATIONS ARMS TRADE TREATY: RUSSIA’S JUSTIFICATIONS 
FOR ABSTENTION AND THE TREATY’S EFFECTIVENESS IN APPLICATION 
 
Joshua D. Sorensen* 
 			
Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades, many States have recognized the need for 
a multi-lateral treaty regulating weapons that are used all over the world 
to commit genocides and other atrocities. The United Nations (UN) Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT) was passed on April 2, 2013, and came into effect on 
December 24, 2014, as an attempt to address this problem. However, 
after a nearly universal acceptance of the need for such a treaty, Russia, 
along with many other key States, has abstained from joining the ATT. 
While Russia did not object outright to an arms trade treaty, Russia does 
not have any clear intent to join the current ATT. Russia has listed 
several reasons for its abstention including: the non-binding nature of 
the treaty, the treaty’s failure to address transfers to private parties, the 
treaty’s low standards, and its potentially discriminatory effect against 
Russia.  
This Comment considers the validity of Russia’s justifications for 
abstention and the effectiveness of the ATT without Russia and other key 
States being parties to the treaty. Russia’s abstention raises serious 
questions as to the ATT’s effectiveness. Russia is the second largest arms 
distributor in the world and is more than capable of arming States that 
would otherwise be barred under the ATT. Additionally, since transfers 
to private parties remain unregulated and because much of the treaty’s 
terms are mere recommendations, it is likely the ATT is nothing more 
than a superficial attempt to remedy a deep problem. However, while the 
ATT may seem to be weak, it is still a step in the right direction.
																																								 																					*	Juris Doctor, December 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Provo, UT.	
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I.  INTRODUCTION 	
The world has a problem: arms have been and are still used to 
commit genocides and other atrocities on nearly a daily basis,1 and small 
or conventional arms cause approximately ninety percent of these 
atrocities.2 A half a million civilians or more are killed annually in 
conflicts using conventional arms,3 and there are “two bullets” produced 
for every person on this planet.4 The transfer of arms continues to ignite 
differences into full-fledged armed conflict, which allows major arms 
exporters “to profit from the misery of others.”5 The question remains 
whether the global community can effectively band together to solve this 
problem.  
The United Nations (UN) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was passed in 
an effort to reduce arms from ending up in the hands of those who will 
use them to commit such atrocities.6 The ATT is “for the purpose of: 
contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; 
reducing human suffering; [and] promoting cooperation, transparency 
and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in 
conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.”7   
The ATT has been described as “the most important [treaty] in the 
history of the United Nations in the field of conventional arms control 
standards.”8 But is the ATT really the solution? UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon opened the 2012 General Assembly stating, “[t]he arms 
trade fuels ill-regulated and civil conflicts, destabilizes regions and 
expands the capabilities of terrorists and criminal networks. We do not 
have a multilateral treaty on global trade in conventional arms. It's a 
shame.” 9  The ATT was designed to “prevent and eradicate” this 
problem;10 but, will it meet this goal?  
Whenever States with principled positions attempt to reach an 
agreement, some question arises as to the viability of such an 
agreement.11 Not every UN Member State12 has faith in the ATT’s ability 																																								 																					
1 See Anup Shah, Arms Trade—A Major Cause of Suffering, GLOBAL ISSUES (June 30, 2013), 
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/73/arms-trade-a-major-cause-of-suffering. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 Earth has a population of over seven billion people. See Sergei Vasilenkov, UN unable to take 
arms under control, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 22, 2013), http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/22-03-
2013/124138-un_arms_control-0/. 
5 See Anup Shah, Small Arms—They Cause 90% of Civilian Casualties, GLOBAL ISSUES (Jan. 
21, 2006), http://www.globalissues.org/article/78/small-arms-they-cause-90-of-civilian-casualties. 
6 United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, available at https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf. 
7 Id. 
8 Lyuba Lulko, Will There Ever Be Order in International Arms Trade?, PRAVADA.RU (Jun. 
07, 2012), http://english.pravda.ru/business/companies/06-07-2012/121571-
international_arms_trade-0/. 
9 Id. 
10 See United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6. 
11 See Vasilenkov, supra note 4. 
12 At its founding in 1945, the UN was comprised of 51 original members. Over the years, the 
UN’s growth in membership has risen to 193 Member States. See Growth in United Nations 
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to effectively address the problem. Russia, one of the world’s largest 
dealers in arms,13 believes the ATT is no more than a superficial Band-
Aid on a deep wound.14 And if Russia does not get on board with the 
ATT, then how effective can it really be? 
Russia’s justifications for abstention from signing on to the ATT 
have some merit, as the ATT does not address arms transfers to private 
parties. However, Russia’s justifications are also likely, in part, a ploy to 
allow Russia to transfer arms to States that might otherwise be prohibited 
under the ATT. A nation balancing conflicting interests can be tricky; 
such is the situation with Russia, therefore justifying its abstention from 
the ATT is complex. 
Additionally, the ATT’s effectiveness in accomplishing its intended 
purpose is in serious question. First, the ATT fails to specifically address 
transfers to non-state actors. Second, it leaves the black market relatively 
untouched. Further, the ATT’s goals will, more often than not, be 
subjugated to the interest of the parties, resulting in transfers that might 
arguably be prohibited under the ATT but are economically or politically 
advantageous to the exporting nation. Finally, even if the ATT can draw 
more abstainers to support it, certain Member States will remain in 
opposition by expressly opposing it or through abstaining to recognize it. 
This Comment provides a close look at the ATT and at Russia’s 
objections to signing the ATT. This Comment is not an attempt to solve 
any specific problems but, rather, an attempt to consider whether 
Russia’s concerns are valid or mere political posturing. Part II briefly 
reviews the history of the ATT. Part III takes a look at Russia’s specific 
justifications for abstention from signing the ATT, then considers the 
validity of Russia’s justifications. Part IV contemplates the potential 
effectiveness of the ATT when Russia is not a party. Finally, Part V 
concludes by questioning the effect of the UN General Assembly’s treaty 
process.  
  
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF ATT 
 
The ATT is “the first attempt of humanity to control the movement 
of the products that kill about 700,000 people a year with 500,000 of 
them being civilians.”15 Even though many, if not all, Member States 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																
Membership, 1945 – Present, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
13 See SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE (March 17, 2014), http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/AT_march_2014. After 
the end of the Cold War, Russia’s arms trade spent a few years in shambles. In recent years, Russia 
has been making a strong comeback, usurping first place from the United States in 2013. 
14 See UN General Assembly Approves 1st Global Conventional Arms Trade Treaty, THE 
VOICE OF RUSSIA (Apr. 3, 2013), http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_04_03/UN-General-Assembly-
approves-1st-global-conventional-arms-trade-treaty/; Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join 
– Moscow, RT (Sept. 26, 2013), http://rt.com/politics/arms-russia-trade-join-377/. 
15 Lulko, supra note 8. 
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have uniformly recognized the need for such a treaty,16 such uniformity 
is not present in regards to the treaty’s content.17 A sufficient number of 
Member States have, nonetheless, moved forward with the ATT.18 
Efforts to curb arms transfers are not new, but many of the efforts 
have proved unfruitful.19 Since the early 1900s, the global community 
has made efforts to regulate arms transfers but with little avail.20 For 
example, in 1925, a draft Convention on the Arms Trade was produced, 
but never adopted. 21  Over the next century, major importing and 
exporting States consistently opposed such attempts to regulate arms, 
seeing the free trade of arms as necessary for developing alliances and 
building a strong economy.22  
From 2008 to 2012, the top five major exporters of arms in the 
world—accounting for approximately seventy-five percent of arms 
exports—were the United States of America, Russia, Germany, France, 
and China. 23  Not surprisingly, even today, many of the top arms-
exporting countries have continued to provide opposition to global 
efforts to regulate arm transfers.24 And even with the passing of the ATT, 
Russia and China have abstained from joining the treaty.25 
 
																																								 																					
16 See UN Secretary-General, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common 
International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms, A/62/278 (part 
II) (Aug. 17, 2007), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/463/53/PDF/N0746353.pdf?OpenElement. 
17 See Vasilenkov, supra note 4. India abstained from the ATT due to its concern with how the 
ATT would handle its current arms contracts. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, UN Treaty is First Aimed 
at Regulating Global Arms Sales, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/arms-trade-treaty-approved-at-
un.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Article 26 of the ATT addresses how the ATT affects other, 
already-existing international agreements. See United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6. 
18 See Arms Trade Treaty, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
19 See American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. International Legal Materials, 
52 I.L.M. 985 (Apr. 2, 2013). 
20 See id. 
21 See Arms Trade Treaty, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/att (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
22 American Society of International Law, supra note 19. 
23 See International Arms Transfers, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/05 (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
24 See, e.g., Rick Gladstone, UN Misses Its Deadline for Arms Pact, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
(July 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/world/proponents-of-arms-trade-treaty-urge-
final-approval.html?_r=0. 
25 See G.A. Res. 67/234B, UN GAOR, 67th Sess. UN DOC. ATT Voting Chart, (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20130402/ATTVotingChart.pdf. 
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Figure 126 	
While various agreements concerning arms trade existed prior to the 
ATT, a need for a more multilateral, collaborative effort was evident. 
These agreements were widely considered to be inadequate as they were 
quite limited in their scope and reach and more voluntary than 
obligatory.27  Furthermore, States were exasperated by the seemingly 
nonstop violation of these agreements and UN embargoes.28 Shortly after 
the Persian Gulf War in 1991, various non-governmental organizations 
began a lobbying campaign to curtail arms transfers. 29 However, a vote 
in the General Assembly did not come until more than two decades 
later.30  
Finally in 2006, Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Kenya, and others, 
in an effort to curb this problem, proposed the first-ever multilateral 
treaty aimed at regulating the world’s arms trade.31 Member States that 
pushed the ATT forward contended that the ATT was needed to prevent 
the transfer of arms to those who would destroy peace, commit atrocities, 
and weaken the world’s efforts to cut poverty.32  
Nonetheless, passing the ATT was not without difficulty, even with 
consensus among the vast majority of States to the need of such a 
treaty.33 By July 2012, six years after the proposal first came, a draft 
treaty was finally proposed. However, some Member States objected to 
the draft and sought more time to negotiate the terms of the treaty.34 The 																																								 																					
26 See International Arms Transfers, supra note 23. 
27 These agreements were considered inadequate as they were quite limited in their scope and 
reach and as they were more voluntary than obligatory. 
28 See Louis Charbonneau, UN Arms Embargoes Don’t Work, Arms Treaty Needed: Rights 
Groups, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-arms-treaty-un-
idUSBRE92I1A120130319. 
29 The Persian War made clear the problem that Iraq had more arms than France. See 
MacFarquhar, supra note 17. 
30 See id. 
31 Member States that first introduced the arms trade resolution at the UN General Assembly 
included Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the United Kingdom. See G.A. 
Res. 61/89, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., UN DOC. A/RES/61/89, (Dec. 18, 2006), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/61/89&Lang=E. 
32 See UN Secretary-General, The Arms Trade Treaty: Rep. of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 
A/66/166, (July 20, 2011) (citing views of member states on the need for an Arms Trade Treaty). 
33 See Vasilenkov, supra note 4. 
34 The United States was a leading force in the objection to the adoption of the 2012 draft. See 
Gladstone, supra note 24. 
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objectors, headed by the United States, suggested that the 2012 draft 
inadequately addressed the complex problem of illegal arms trafficking 
and that in order to achieve consensus more time and revision was 
needed.35 At the time, however, the United States did not provide any 
clear specifics as to what exactly needed to be addressed.36 And some 
questioned whether the United States had any intent to join and ratify the 
ATT, as economic and political pressures might not favor its existence.37 
In the first round of 2013 negotiations, the ATT’s main objectors—Iran, 
North Korea, and Syria—prevented consensus. 38  During the second 
round of negotiations in March 2013, consensus once again seemed 
unlikely, but Member States, led by the United States, developed a 
circumventing process around the need for consensus,39 requiring only a 
majority vote.40  
After years of debate, the UN General Assembly finally passed the 
ATT on April 2, 2013.41  One hundred and fifty-four Member States 
voted in favor of the ATT, with only Iran, North Korea, and Syria voting 
in outright opposition.42 Not every Member State voted; Russia abstained 
from the vote along with twenty-two other Member States.43 The ATT 
was not to come into force until ninety days after the fiftieth Member 
State ratified the treaty.44 
 The treaty has moved forward at an unprecedented rate,45 meeting 
the minimum ratification requirement in less than a year and a half.46 The 
number of Member States who have ratified the ATT surpassed fifty on 
September 25, 2014; the treaty entered into force on December 24, 																																								 																					
35 The United States firmly stated that the regulation of arms should be controlled by the 
individual states. Press Statement, Victoria Nuland, Department Spokesperson, Arms Trade Treaty 
Conference, Office of the Spokesperson (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/195622.htm. From the ATT’s early days in 2006, the 
United States had been a consistent and, at oft times, lone objector to the ATT. See Paul Holtom & 
Mark Bromley, Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations, SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security, available at http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2014/files/sipri-yearbook-
2014-chapter-10-section-i. 
36 See Nuland, supra note 35. 
37 See Noah Rayman, The Real News at the UN: U.S. Signs Arms Trade Treaty, TIME (Sept. 26, 
2013), http://world.time.com/2013/09/26/the-real-news-at-the-u-n-u-s-signs-arms-trade-treaty/. 
38	 The Long Journey Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (June 5, 
2013), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/the-long-journey-towards-an-arms-trade-treaty.	
39 See G.A. Res. 67/234A, UN GAOR 67th Sess. UN Doc. A/RES/67/234 (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/234. 
40 The Long Journey Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 38. 
41 See G.A. Res. 67/234B, supra note 25. 
42 Iran, North Korea, and Syria voted “No” in opposition of the ATT. See id. 
43 Abstaining nations include Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, LAO PDR, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, and Yemen. See id. 
44 See United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 22. The specific procedures for 
ratifying a treaty may be different in every State, but typically ratification is the legislative process 
authorizing the treaty. 
45 Optimistic projections for when the ATT would enter into force hover around three years. 
See Paul Hotom & Mark Bromley, Next Steps for the Arms Trade Treaty: Securing Early Entry Into 
Force, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (June 3, 2013), 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_06/Next-Steps-for-the-Arms-Trade-Treaty_Securing-Early-
Entry-Into-Force. 
46 See Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 18. 
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2014.47 However, only time can truly tell what effect the ATT will have 
on the transfer of the conventional arms, which kill someone every 
minute.48 
 
III. RUSSIA’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ABSTENTION  
AND THEIR VALIDITY 
 
While having expressed support for the idea of a multi-lateral arms 
trade treaty, Russia does not have any clear intention of signing the ATT. 
Although, it is possible that Russia may decide to join the treaty at some 
point down the road.49  Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Alexeevich 
Ryabkov50 stated at the Russia Arms Expo 2013, “Our decision on 
whether we should join this treaty has not yet been taken. It will be taken 
later, with consideration of many factors not excluding the speed of the 
treaty’s ratification by countries that had already signed it.”51  
At the time of adoption in 2013, Russia abstained from signing the 
agreement in order to perform a more careful analysis.52 Even the UN 
Secretary General recognized that “sales of conventional weapons was 
an important and complex sector, affecting the financial interests of the 
countries, their national security and foreign policy on the one hand, and 
directly relating to humanitarian and legal aspects of international law on 
the other.”53 
After studying the ATT more carefully, Russia had several 
objections to the ATT and concluded that it “lacked substance.”54 While 
the ATT’s proponents believe that it will help stop the transfer of arms to 
terrorists,55 “Russia is more skeptical.”56  
Russia has raised several justifications for its abstention from the 
ATT.57 Among those justifications are the following: a) the ATT is not 
legally binding; b) the ATT does not address transfers to private actors; 																																								 																					
47 See id. 
48 See Shah, supra note 5. 
49 The Russian envoy to the UN, Vitaly I. Churkin, noted that Russia is concerned “about what 
he called ambiguities in the treaty, including how terms like genocide would be defined, had pushed 
his government to abstain.” But Russia did not completely reject the ATT altogether. See 
MacFarquhar, supra note 17. 
50 Mr. Ryabkov has been the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation since 2008. 
See Sergey Alexeevich Ryabkov, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA, 
http://www.mid.ru/bul_ns_en.nsf/kartaflat/en03.02.04 (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
51 Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join – Moscow, supra note 14. 
52 Igor Siletsky, Moscow Not to Sign Arms Trade Treaty that Discriminates Against Russian 
Military-Industrial Sector, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA (May 20, 2014), 
http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_20/Moscow-not-to-sign-Arms-Trade-Treaty-that-
discriminates-against-Russian-military-industrial-sector-9345/. 
53 Vasilenkov, supra note 4. 
54 Siletsky, supra note 52. 
55 Secretary of State, John Kerry, stated, “It will help reduce the risk that international transfers 
of conventional arms will be used to carry out the world’s worst crimes, including terrorism, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” MacFarquhar, supra note 17. 
56 See Associated Press, U.S. to Sign New Arms Trade Treaty, Russia Undecided, THE 
MOSCOW TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/us-to-sign-new-
arms-trade-treaty-russia-undecided/481080.html. 
57 See Siletsky, supra note 52; Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join – Moscow, supra 
note 14. 
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c) the ATT’s standards are too low; and d) the ATT discriminates against 
Russia.58     
Even though more than the requisite fifty States quickly ratified the 
ATT, Russia will likely not become party to the treaty. Political pressure 
may mount against Russia to join the treaty, but Russian history has 
shown time and again that Russia is not afraid to stand on its own. 
Russia’s justifications for abstention are motivated in part by valid 
concerns and in part by political posturing.  
 
A. Legally Binding 
 
While Russia claims that the ATT is not legally binding, the ATT is 
as legally binding as any multi-lateral treaty. However, Russia’s concern 
is not completely without merit, it is only misstated. Russia’s real 
concern is that much of the ATT’s text is recommendatory rather than 
obligatory. Even so, the ATT will likely have an effect on customary 
international law in establishing state practice. 
 
1. Russia: ATT Is Not Legally Binding 
 
Russian representatives have expressed concerns that the ATT is not 
legally binding.59 Having studied the ATT more fully, Vadim Kozyulin, 
professor at the Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow,60 stated that 
while the ATT was intended to create “rules of civilized weapons 
trading,” it does not require those rules.61 He added that the rules are 
more recommendatory than obligatory and “the contract does not provide 
penalties for its violation.” 62  Article 14, the ATT’s enforcement 
provision, provides only that “Each State Party shall take appropriate 
measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement the 
provisions of this Treaty.”63 Kozyulin concluded, “Since the agreement is 
not legally binding, we do not want to join it.” 64  
2. The ATT Is Actually Legally Binding but Lacks Teeth 
 
Russia’s concern that the ATT is not legally binding is misguided. 
The ATT is legally binding. The ATT “is a multilateral, legally-binding 
agreement that establishes common standards for the international trade 
																																								 																					
58 See Siletsky, supra note 52 (justifying Russia’s abstention by contending that the ATT is not 
legally binding, does not address transfers to non-state actors, and is discriminatory against Russia); 
Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join – Moscow, supra note 14 (justifying Russia’s 
abstentions by alleging that the ATT’s standards are lower than Russia’s standards). 
59 See id. 
60 See Expert, PIR CENTER, http://www.pircenter.org/en/experts/19-kozyulin-vadim-b (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
61 Siletsky, supra note 52. 
62 Id. 
63 United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6, Art. 14. 
64 Siletsky, supra note 52. 
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of conventional weapons.”65 Therefore, Russia’s contention is misstated. 
It may be better stated that the ATT’s text is more recommendatory 
rather than obligatory, but all of a treaty’s provisions need not be 
obligatory for the treaty to be legally binding. 
While the ATT is binding on the Member-State parties, it lacks any 
real bite. The ATT’s text binds the Member-State parties to very little, 
leaving much of the treaty as suggestive or recommendatory. Russia’s 
justification that the ATT is more recommendatory in nature than 
binding is not completely without grounds, and Russia is not alone in this 
assertion. Even some supporters of the ATT have admitted that it is not 
obligatory, stating that it “will be used . . . [more] as political and moral 
guidelines.”66 Such a contention is supported by the text of the ATT.  
Although the treaty requires some form of ratification (making the 
treaty part of a state’s domestic law),67 much of the ATT’s text suggests 
possible courses of action rather than requiring much of anything. 
Articles 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 repeatedly use “encouraged” instead 
of “shall”. Even when “shall” is occasionally used, it is typically 
discounted by qualifying language. Several specific examples from the 
text of the ATT may illustrate this plainly. 
First, in connection with the ATT’s attempt to regulate the diversion 
of arms, Article 11 does not require that the exporting or importing party 
report or share information with other States.68 Article 11 provides: 
“States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information with one 
another.”69 Additionally, “States Parties are encouraged to report to other 
States Parties . . . on measures taken.” 70  If states are to be held 
accountable for the diversion of arms, then the ATT must require, not 
merely encourage, the reporting and sharing of relevant information. As 
it is written, Member States can choose if and when to provide any 
information. That is not binding. 
Next, Article 15’s International Cooperation provision is almost 
entirely recommendatory. 71  While this provision begins with the 
requirement that “States Parties shall cooperate,” the rest of the provision 
fails to require much of any real cooperation. 72  “States Parties are 
encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, . . . States Parties are 
encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share 
information, as appropriate, . . . States Parties are encouraged to 
cooperate, . . . etc.”73  “Shall” is used one other time in this provision, but 																																								 																					
65 The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (July 19, 2013), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty. 
66 MacFarquhar, supra note 17. 
67 Article 14 requires that “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national 
laws and regulations that implement the provisions of this Treaty.” See United Nations Arms Trade 
Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 14, 21–22. 
68 Id. at art. 11 (emphasis added). 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Id. (emphasis added). 
71 See id. at art. 15. 
72 Id. (emphasis added). 
73 Id. (emphasis added). 
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is quickly discounted by the qualifier, “where jointly agreed.”74 So, even 
though the ATT may initially appear to require international cooperation 
it then makes any type of cooperation something “encouraged” or subject 
to agreement between the nations.   
Further, Article 16 establishes a trust fund for international 
assistance but fails to require any State Parties to contribute to the fund. 
It begins, “A voluntary trust fund shall be established,” but later 
concludes, “Each State Party is encouraged to contribute to the fund.”75 
This provision is yet another example of how the ATT fails to require 
much of anything. 
Lastly, while Article 12 of the ATT seems to require each party to 
“maintain national records . . . of its issuance of export authorizations or 
its actual exports,” it does not require any specific information to be 
included in the reports.76 The ATT, once again, does not require that 
certain information be included but only makes several suggestions as to 
what may be included in the records.77 
While the ATT is technically binding on the Member-State parties, it 
lacks any real teeth. The ATT’s text binds the Member-State parties to 
very little, while leaving much of the treaty as suggestive or 
recommendatory.  Russia may be justified in its reticence to join the 
ATT as it actually requires very little of the parties. However, such a 
treaty may help to establish state practice when determining customary 
international law.78 To say that the ATT is not legally binding is false, 
and even the recommendatory portions will likely play an important role 
in creating legally binding obligations concerning the transfer of 
conventional arms. 
 
B. Arms Transfers to Non-State Actors 
 
Russia’s concern that the ATT does not specifically address arms 
transfers to non-state actors is a valid concern. Such transfers are not 
expressly addressed in the ATT and likely result in the furtherance of 
the very types of human suffering and instability that the ATT is 
intended to prevent. 
1. Russia: ATT Does Not Address Arms Transfers to Non-state Actors 
 
Russia is deeply concerned that arms transfers to non-state actors are 
not within the scope of the ATT. On a number of occasions, Russia 
claims to have made efforts to add language to the ATT that would 																																								 																					
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include “non-state actors” into the scope of the treaty.79 These efforts 
proved unsuccessful, as they were not fully considered by the General 
Assembly.80 Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov noted that the 
proponents’ refusal to regulate the transfer of arms to non-state actors is 
one of Russia’s main objections to signing the ATT.81  
 
2. The ATT Does Not Specifically Address Arms Transfers to Non-state 
Actors 
 
Russia’s concern that the ATT does not specifically address arms 
transfers to non-state actors is valid. Russia was not alone in recognizing 
the ATT’s failure to address arms transfers to non-state actors.82 The 
ATT fails to expressly prohibit or even address transfers to non-state 
actors.83 
The ATT’s text appears to only consider transfers to other States, 
and does not mention other non-state actors. 84  For example, in 
considering whether or not the export is “prohibited,” Article 7, section 1 
requires that the “exporting State Party” take into account “information 
provided by the importing State.”85 Article 8 only addresses transfers to 
State Parties.86 A major drawback to the ATT is that these export and 
import provisions do not account for the possibility of exporting the arms 
to a non-state actor. 
Russia is not alone in its concern with the ATT’s failure to prohibit 
transfers to non-state actors.87 For example, in 2011, China commented, 
“The arms trade should be strictly limited to transactions between 
Sovereign States and transfers of arms to non-state actors should be 
prohibited, so as to effectively combat and curb illegal trafficking and 
misuse of weapons.”88 In 2012, the Ivory Coast urged that “the transfer 
of arms to non-state actors should be specifically banned by an ATT.”89 
However, the ATT’s proponents have asserted that it is necessary to 
allow arms transfers to “liberation movements facing abusive 
governments.” 90 That assertion is problematic for many reasons. First, 
there are several questions. Perhaps transferring arms to non-state actors 																																								 																					
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attempting to overthrow their government does not further the goal of the 
ATT?  What does “abusive governments” mean? Does it mean a 
government that is not in favor with western countries, or does it have 
another possible meaning? Second, Russia has not said that the ATT 
must prohibit any and all arms transfers to non-state actors, but only that 
the ATT’s failure to address the issue is a major omission.   
Russia is justified in its concern over the ATT’s failure to address 
arms transfers to non-state actors. Leaving out non-state actors entirely is 
problematic. There are many instances of arms transfers to non-state 
actors in the countries of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, and 
Yemen.91 Non-state actors in countries such as these frequently commit 
atrocities.92 In the first eight months of 2014, the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State, a non-state actor, killed or seriously injured over 24,000 civilians 
in Iraq.93 For these reasons, transfers to non-state actors cut against the 
ATT’s purpose. 
While the ATT restricts transfers to legitimate governments who are 
deemed unfit for transfers, it fails to address the problems of those who 
fight in opposition to their government.94 Russian media reported that 
Russia’s interest in including private parties within the scope of the ATT 
“stems from a desire to protect the existing legitimate government 
authorities from attempts of a military mutiny . . . which has already 
taken place in Libya and Syria.”95 Some non-state actors of concern may 
include groups such as terrorist organizations, private military 
companies, political parties, civilian militias, paramilitary groups, and 
arms traffickers. One factor that may have played a role in failing to 
address non-state actors in the ATT is that precisely defining non-state 
actors is difficult. Other factors might include the finite time for 
consensus and individual national interests in opposition of Member-
States. 
 
C. ATT’s Standards 
 
While it is valid that the low standards included in the ATT would 
not effectively achieve its purpose, this justification is likely a ploy by 
Russia. Russia’s real concern is that the ATT would prohibit many of its 
current arms transfers. Thus, it is unlikely that Russia’s claim, that the 
ATT’s standards are in fact lower than Russia’s standards, is valid. 
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1. Russia: ATT’s Standards Are Too Low 
 
Russia claims that the ATT’s standards are not strict enough.96 From 
the beginning, Russia called for stricter “regulations on the re-export of 
weapons.” 97  This proved unsuccessful. Deputy Foreign Minister 
Ryabkov explained Russia’s abstention by stating that the ATT’s 
standards are “inferior” to Russia’s own standards.98 Russia claims that 
their arms transfers “are under strict control.” 99 Countries that import 
Russia’s arms are required to provide a certificate, which allegedly 
guarantees that the arms will not be sent or supplied to third-party 
countries.100  
The ATT has other shortcomings. Even supporters have admitted 
that the ATT has “significant loopholes.”101 As mentioned above, the 
ATT’s focus is on arms sales to other State parties and not on transfers to 
non-state actors. Additionally, the ATT leaves open other “ways in 
which conventional arms are transferred including as gifts, loans, leases, 
and aid.”102 
 
2. The ATT’s Standards Are Likely Not Lower than Russia’s 
 
Russia’s justification that the ATT’s standards are too low is likely 
an attempt to conceal another, more probable motive: to avoid being 
subject to the arms regulations. While Russia alleges that its own 
standards are higher than the ATT’s standards, the fact that the country 
transfers arms to Syria and other nations may indicate otherwise.  
Many Russian arms transfers to Syria would be prohibited under the 
ATT.  Over the past few years alone, the Syrian government has directly 
attacked its civilian population.103 Attacks against civilian populations 
are prohibited under the ATT.104 Article 6 of the ATT prohibits transfers 
to States that attack their civilian populations if the exporting State has 
knowledge at the time of the arms transfer authorization that the arms 
will be used in committing prohibited acts and atrocities.105 Under the 
ATT, any arms transfers from Russia to Assad ruled Syria would not be 
allowed because of Russia’s knowledge that the arms will be used in a 
way prohibited by the ATT. 
Russia’s justification that the ATT’s standards are too low is not 
valid. Article 7 provides that the export assessment should be done 																																								 																					
96 See Siletsky, supra note 52; Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join – Moscow, supra 
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“pursuant to [the Exporting State’s] national control system.” 106  So 
Russia can claim that its standards are higher than the ATT’s standards, 
but the ATT does not prohibit Russia from using their “higher” 
standards. In fact, the ATT even requires States to incorporate their own 
national standards, disarming Russia’s original claim. 
 
D. Discriminatory Effect 
 
The concern that the ATT may discriminate against Russian 
interests is valid. The ATT may, in fact, prohibit more Russian arms 
transfers than American or other western States’ transfers should Russia 
become a party to the ATT.  
1. Russia: ATT Discriminates Against Russian Interests 
 
Russia claims that the ATT, as drafted, discriminates against Russian 
interests. Believing that the implications of the ATT had not been fully 
considered, Russia expressed concern that the treaty would discriminate 
against “the Russian military-industrial complex.”107 In an effort to avoid 
the negative implications of such a treaty, Russia did not become a party 
to the ATT.108 Rather, Russia will continue to supply arms according to 
“its own ideas about who, where and why it is selling these weapons.”109 
According to Kozyulin, “The [ATT] has a number of points that can be 
considered discriminating against [Russia].”110  
The foremost concern revolves around the likely negative impact on 
Russia’s military-industrial sector. 111  Joining the treaty would affect 
Russia’s “ability to supply arms to individual States, which the US and 
the West can equate to ‘terrorist regimes.’”112 Russia believes that the 
ATT is drafted to prohibit more Russian arms transfers than American or 
other western States’ transfers.113 
Another of Russia’s concerns is with the potentially discriminatory 
effect of the amendment provision of the ATT.114 Article 20 of the ATT 
provides the option, according to some experts, of making amendments 
that may be even harsher on Russia, depriving “some Russian producers 
from certain arms markets . . . [a]nd . . . limit[ing] the supply of arms into 
Russia.”115   
Russia did not end the ATT talks because it was optimistic that its 
concerns would be taken more seriously.116 However, until the above 																																								 																					
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mentioned concerns are more adequately addressed, Russia feels “the 
entire story of the contract looks more like another attempt to ‘put 
pressure’ on Russia and displace it from its traditional markets.”117 
Russia sees the ATT as an example of the West’s efforts to “use 
international treaties as a political lever to limit Russian military 
exports.”118 
 
2. The ATT May Discriminate Against Russian Interests in Its Effect but 
Not on Its Face 
 
The justification that the ATT discriminates against Russia, if indeed 
true, is a valid concern for Russia. Russia has not claimed that the ATT, 
on its face, expressly discriminates against Russia, but rather that the 
result of the ATT is discriminatory.119  
First, if Russia were a party to the ATT, a significant curb in arms 
sales would likely result, seriously damaging Russia’s military-industrial 
sector.120 As reported by Russian news outlets, at least half of Russia’s 
arms transfers go to nations, such as Syria, Venezuela, and China, which 
have been deemed “unreliable or criminal” due to previous behavior.121 
If half of Russia’s arms transfers go to States that would likely be 
prohibited under the ATT, then serious damage to Russia’s arms trade 
business would result from joining the ATT. The ATT may actually 
affect more Russian arms transfers than American arms transfers. That 
result would not only be discriminatory in relative terms, but it would 
have a large impact in absolute economic terms.  After all, Russia is the 
second largest arms supplier in the world.122 
Additionally, the fact that the United States signed and ratified the 
ATT and that Russia abstained from signing the treaty may indicate that 
the treaty is more favorable to American interests than to Russian 
interests. With the help of its allies, the United States has a history of 
promoting favorable UN resolutions that effectively create sales markets 
for its businesses.123 Strong American and European business interests 
drive a lot of political action.124  The United States and some other 
western States joined the ATT after opposing it for a number of years. 
That delay may suggest that the United States and the other western 
States only joined after crafting the treaty to better favor their national 
interests.125  																																								 																					
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Russia is not alone in thinking that the ATT may be discriminatory. 
Other States, such as Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, have expressed 
concern that the ATT “might be abused to create political pressure.”126 
Even American media outlets recognize the “hope” of the ATT’s 
proponents that some otherwise “reluctant to ratify” nations “will feel 
public pressure.”127 The United States and its allies in favor of American 
interests at the expense of other nations’ interests would likely wield this 
abuse of public pressure. Throughout history large, powerful western 
nations have used their political and economic power to advance their 
own national interests over the interests of weaker nations.128 The ATT 
might be yet another tool to create pressure on countries to behave in a 
way that advances western interests over other nations’ own interests. 
Lastly, Russia’s concern with future amendments to the ATT 
possibly being discriminatory against Russia has no more basis than it 
has with any other multi-lateral treaty. This concern may be present with 
all treaties that are subject to future amendments. Yes, Article 20 of the 
ATT provides for future amendments to the ATT; however, Article 24 
provides for the ability of any party to withdraw from the treaty.129 In the 
future, States will likely propose amendments that will better protect 
their own national interests. Such proposals may hurt other States’ 
interests. It is up to each State to protect its own interests. Russia can 
vote for or against amendments, propose their own amendments, or 
withdraw completely from the ATT, just like any other nation.  
Russia may be justified in its concern over the ATT’s possible 
discriminatory effects. The ATT may treat western States more favorably 
than Russia. Naturally, a State is not inclined to join a treaty that may 
unfairly value other States’ interests over its own. For this reason, Russia 
and other States may have reason to be skeptical of the ATT and its 
potential discriminatory effect on some countries and its favorable 
treatment towards others.130  
It is possible that hurting Russia’s arms trade business is necessary to 
achieve the ATT’s purpose. Some have admitted that “making it harder 
for Russia to argue that its arms deals with Syria are legal under 
international law” will help to achieve the ATT’s goal of curbing arms 
sales “that kill tens of thousands of people every year.”131 Clearly, if the 
purpose of the ATT is to curb Russia’s arms transfers, then it is 
discriminatory. However, on its face, the purpose of the ATT is not to 
curb Russian transfers, but it is to contribute to “peace, security, and 
stability,” to reduce “human suffering,” and to promote “cooperation, 
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transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international 
trade in conventional arms.”132 
 
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ATT IN APPLICATION 
 
Though there may be reason to question the ATT’s potential 
effectiveness in its application, the ATT may still be a step in the right 
direction. Several things, however, cut against the ATT’s likely success 
in fully achieving its goal to curb arms being used in the commission of 
genocides and other atrocities. First, Russia and other key states, such as 
China, are not parties to the treaty. Second, the treaty’s text has large 
gaps, such as its failure to address the transfer of arms to non-state 
actors. Lastly, interests of individual Member State parties will subjugate 
the ATT’s goals. 
First, many States, including Russia, either rejected the ATT or 
abstained from joining it.133 Additionally, the majority of the States who 
are signatories to the ATT have not yet ratified it and may avoid ratifying 
the treaty altogether.134  Just as various countries thought it unwise to 
join the treaty when the largest producer and seller of weapons was 
rejecting the treaty,135 it may be unwise to think the treaty will be 
effective when the second largest producer and seller is not party to the 
treaty. The more countries that do not feel compelled to abide by the 
ATT—either because they are not party to the treaty or because they do 
not feel obligated—will equate to more arms transfers occurring outside 
the confines of the ATT. Nic Marsh of the Peace Research Institute 
Oslo136 stated, “Having the abstentions from two major arms exporters 
lessens the moral weight of the treaty . . . . By abstaining they have left 
their options open.”137 
Moreover, some of the Member States that most needed to join the 
treaty did not. Skeptics contend that the ATT will experience the same 
fate as the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which prohibited 
“the use, transfer and stockpiling of cluster bombs.”138 In the case of the 
CCM, States that had never made cluster bombs readily signed the treaty, 
while States that made and possessed cluster bombs did not sign the 
treaty.139 The United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Spain, Italy, and Sweden have all ratified the ATT. However, Russia, 
with a quarter of global arms sales, and China, with another five percent 
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of global sales, have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.140 Several 
major arms importers, including India, Pakistan, South Korea, and 
Singapore, have avoided ratifying the treaty as well.141 Further, of the 
twenty-three countries that abstained, many have the kind of human 
rights records that the ATT is designed to prevent.142 
Second, the ATT’s text has large gaps that can leave Member States 
to act almost without restriction in some arms transfer areas. For 
example, the ATT does not specifically address arms transfers to non-
state actors,143 thereby failing to prevent the transfer of arms to non-state 
actors or other illegal transfers which often result in the commission of 
atrocities contrary to the ATT’s purpose. Several Member States 
expressed concern that the ATT’s omission of non-state actors “deeply 
weakened the [ATT] and undermined its effectiveness.”144 Nicaragua’s 
delegate expressed concern with this gap, calling it, “dangerous,” 
recalling the “tens of thousands of lives” that were lost in his country 
during the 1980s due to arms transfers to non-state actors.145 
The current situation with the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ 
highlights this “gap” in a different light.146 Countries party to the ATT, 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, “have all either supplied or said 
they will supply weapons to [non-state actors] . . . fighting the Islamic 
State in Syria and Iraq and . . . the Assad regime in Syria.”147 
Moreover, these gaps in the text may have been caused in part by the 
many competing States’ interests. The “black market” transfers arms 
through poorly controlled regions and “under the guise of equipment or 
spare parts.”148 These black markets’ successes are due in large part to 
weak, compromised agreements.149 The treaty does not properly take 
care of arms trafficking or “the illegal trade through third countries,”150 
which seriously undermines the ATT’s effectiveness. 
Finally, the ATT’s main purpose to “reduce human suffering” will be 
subjugated to other State interests and may possibly become so diluted 
that it will lose meaning in the arms context. “As long as the world is 
divided into the East and the West, ‘democratic’ and ‘dictatorial’ 
regimes, ‘terrorist Islamists’ and ‘civilized Christians,’ the interests of 																																								 																					
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national security and commercial secrets will always be more important 
than world peace.” 151  Many States’ budgets are largely shaped by 
revenue received from arms exports, and these economic and political 
interests have incentivized States to violate already existing arms 
norms.152 
Further, the multilateral nature of the ATT provides for low 
standards and recommendatory rather than obligatory language. For 
example, many African countries have long supported the ATT and 
joined the treaty. These African governments recognized that the ATT’s 
text is weaker than they had hoped.153 However, some have hoped that 
even though the treaty’s text might be weak, the ATT “would curb the 
arms sales that have fueled many conflicts.”154  But without Russia, 
China, and various other influential Member States, the effectiveness of 
the ATT remains questionable. 
Nevertheless, when all has been said and done, some are still hopeful 
that the ATT “will help to reduce armed violence.”155 Anna MacDonald, 
Head of Arms Control for Oxfam International,156 stated, “This treaty 
won’t solve the problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but 
it will help to prevent future Syrias . . . It will help to reduce conflict.” 157 
However, MacDonald’s Syrian example is faulty on its face. Claiming 
that the ATT will stop “future Syrias” from happening is naïve. How 
would it? Russia is the number one supplier of arms to Syria, and Russia 
is not party to the ATT.  
The ATT will not be as effective in accomplishing its purposes since 
Russia and other key States are not party to the treaty, the treaty’s text 
contains large gaps, and the treaty’s interests will lose out to the Member 
State parties’ national interests. However, that does not mean that the 
ATT will fail altogether. Brian Wood, Head of Arms Control and Human 
Rights, believes in the ATT. He noted that what makes the ATT so great 
is that “for the first time in history – states would have to consider 
international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as international 
criminal law, as a basis on which to decide whether an arms transfer 
across borders should go ahead.”158 Even though the ATT may not be as 
strong as many would like, the ATT is still a step in the right direction: a 
step toward global cooperation in creating and preserving peace and 
security. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The ATT’s goal to end the commission of genocides and protect the 
hundreds of thousands of civilians who are killed each year is 
praiseworthy. The killing that occurs on a daily basis is atrocious and the 
global community should come together in an effort to solve this 
problem. Some Member States feel that the ATT is a valiant effort at 
curbing such violence, but others Member States are skeptical and for 
good reason. 
Russia has some real reasons to be concerned with and skeptical of 
the ATT. First, while the ATT is, in all reality, legally binding, the 
ATT’s text appears to be more recommendatory than obligatory. Second, 
the ATT fails to address arms transfers to non-state actors. And third, it 
may be discriminatory in its effect against Russia. However, Russia’s 
justifications are likely, in part, a ploy to allow Russia to transfer arms to 
States that would otherwise be precluded under the ATT.  Russia claims 
that the ATT’s standards are lower than Russia’s standards, but that is 
doubtful. 
Additionally, the ATT will not be as effective as it could be. Without 
Russia joining the treaty, the ATT loses some of its potential 
effectiveness. Russia is one of the largest suppliers of arms in the world, 
meaning that Russia alone could supply arms to many of the States that 
the ATT is intended to prevent from getting arms. Additionally, other 
States, including China, have followed suit and avoided becoming party 
to the ATT. With so many key exporting and importing States abstaining 
or objecting, the ATT will not be able to regulate much of the world 
where the need for such regulation exists. Further, as long as the ATT 
does not regulate transfers to non-state actors, much of the problem the 
treaty was intended to address will be left unaffected by the ATT. Lastly, 
even the Member States who are party to the ATT will likely subordinate 
the ATT’s goals to their own State’s interests. 
Many of the ATT’s shortcomings are likely a result of the process 
through which multi-lateral treaties come into being in the UN General 
Assembly. The ATT is only one example from the many treaties enacted 
by the UN General Assembly.  The ATT’s ineffectiveness is not unique 
to the ATT—the effectiveness of any treaty that goes through the 
General Assembly can be decreased. The Member States, playing 
political games, may want to appease political and social pressures but 
will almost always act in furtherance of their own State’s interest. For 
example, a State may act as if it is in favor of the treaty but might, in 
reality, be doing everything it can to weaken the effect of the treaty.  
With so many different and often opposing interests, a multi-lateral 
treaty will almost never survive the process with any real teeth. Is this the 
result we want from the treaty process? And if a treaty is in fact 
ineffectual, then does it matter whether a State chooses to abstain from or 
join the treaty? 
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While weak treaties may not be the best result, a weak treaty can still 
be seen as a step forward. Indeed, having low standards is better than 
having no standards, and addressing part of the problem is better than 
ignoring the problem altogether. The UN General Assembly treaty 
process may not be perfect, but it is better than nothing and can suffice 
until a better process for creating multi-lateral treaties is implemented.   
